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Abstract: New risk-based solvency requirements for insurance companies across European 
markets have been introduced by Solvency II and will come in force from 1 January 2016. 
These requirements, derived by a Standard Formula or an Internal Model, will be by far more 
risk-sensitive than the required solvency margin provided by the current legislation. In this 
regard, a Partial Internal Model for Premium Risk is developed here for a multi-line Non-
Life insurer. We follow a classical approach based on a Collective Risk Model properly 
extended in order to consider not only the volatility of aggregate claim amounts but also 
expense volatility. To measure the effect of risk mitigation, suitable reinsurance strategies 
are pursued. We analyze how naïve coverage as conventional Quota Share and Excess of 
Loss reinsurance may modify the exact moments of the distribution of technical results. 
Furthermore, we investigate how alternative choices of commission rates in proportional 
treaties may affect the variability of distribution. Numerical results are also figured out in 
the last part of the paper with evidence of different effects for small and large companies. 
The main reasons for these differences are pointed out. 
Keywords: capital requirement for premium risk; collective risk model;  
reinsurance strategies; Solvency II 
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On 10 October 2014, the European Commission adopted a Delegated Act (see [1]) regarding 
implementing rules for Solvency II. This document was published in the Official Journal of European 
Union on 17 January 2015, as Commission Delegated Regulation n. 2015/35, after approval of the 
European Parliament and Council. The new system will lay down new quantitative requirements and a 
proper methodology to evaluate them. These new criteria will come in force from next 1 January 2016. 
Usually for a Non-Life insurer, the Underwriting Risk module (and, in particular, Premium and 
Reserve sub-module) has the greatest impact on Solvency II Capital Requirement (SCR—Solvency 
Capital Requirement). In the valuation of these requirements, the risk mitigation effect of proportional 
and non-proportional reinsurance will be recognized. In this framework, the aim of this paper is to 
describe the risk profile of a general multi-line insurer in order to show the effect of reinsurance,  
one of the most crucial aspects of risk management strategies. 
In order to describe the risk profile of a general multi-line insurer, we start by adopting the structure 
of a classical risk theoretical model where, by known relations in actuarial literature1, only premium risk 
is dealt with. We extend the relation to consider also the volatility of expenses to evaluate the impact on 
both exact moments of technical results and capital requirements. 
Furthermore, to analyze the effect on both profit and losses and capital requirement of alternative 
reinsurance strategies2, two classical proportional and non-proportional treaties have been introduced by 
extending classical relations. We derive moments of combined ratios by considering both the cases of 
Quota-Share (QS) and Excess of Loss (XL) treaties (see [2–4]). According to Quota-Share, we 
analytically describe how alternative methodologies3 to identify ceding commissions have an effect on 
the moments of the probability distribution of combined ratios and on the capital requirements for 
Premium Risk. 
Indeed, in the management practice, the insurer must usually choose among different efficient 
reinsurance strategies, taking into account either profitability sacrifice or capital saving. 
A case study based on two different multi-line Non-Life insurers allows the comparison of the effect 
of wide strategies on both profitability and allocated capital. Parameters of the model have been 
calibrated in order to assure a realistic and consistent comparison between insurers and alternative 
reinsurance strategies. 
In particular, Section 2 briefly describes the structure of the Standard Formula defined by Delegated 
Acts [1] focusing only on a sub-module of Premium and Reserve risk. In Section 3, we provide the 
general framework needed to develop the internal model. Section 4 analytically shows the effect of two 
alternative reinsurance strategies as Quota-Share and Excess of Loss. Finally, in Section 5, numerical 
results are reported by focusing on the capital requirements derived by applying both the Internal Model 
and the market-wide approach of the Standard Formula. Main results have been extended in Section 6 
to evaluate the effect of reinsurance. The conclusion follows.  
                                                 
1 For a frequency-severity approach see, for instance, [5–10]. 
2 Analysis of effect of reinsurance on risk reserve are also in [11–14]. 
3 See [15] for a detailed description of several alternatives to evaluate commissions that reinsurer pays to ceding company. 
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2. A Brief Description of the Delegated Acts (DA) Standard Formula 
We give a brief description of the main elements of Standard Formula for Premium and Reserve Risk 
defined by Delegated Acts (see [1]). Since Quantitative Impact Studies 3 (QIS3), a unique sub-module 
for the joined valuation of risks related both to future claims arising during and after the period until the 
one-year time horizon for the solvency assessment (Premium Risk) and the risk related to a non-sufficient 
amount of the technical provisions (Reserve Risk) has been introduced. The derived capital charge must be 
then aggregated to lapse and cat risk to quantify the capital requirement for Non-Life Underwriting Risk. 
Focusing on Premium and Reserve risk, we have that the capital requirement 𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑁𝐿
𝑆𝐹  is equal to the 
following formula:  
𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑁𝐿
𝑆𝐹 = 3 ∙ σ𝑁𝐿 ∙ 𝑉𝑁𝐿 (1) 
where 𝑉𝑁𝐿  is the volume measure net of reinsurance and σ𝑁𝐿  is the standard deviation for non-life 
premium and reserve. σ𝑁𝐿 can be described as the standard deviation of the ratio between the aggregate 
claims amount of premium and reserve risk and the volume measure, and it is then strictly related to the 
variability coefficient (CV) of aggregate claim amount. 
In particular, Equation (1) assumes to measure the distance between the 99.5% quantile and the mean 
of the probability distribution of aggregate claims amount by using a fixed multiplier of the standard 
deviation equal to 3. This choice has replaced the ρ(σ𝑁𝐿) function used since QIS5 [16], which was 
based on the assumption of a LogNormal distribution of total losses. From a practical point of view, 
skewness of distribution is not directly taken into account anymore. The drawback is a potential 
underestimation of capital requirement for small insurers and an overestimation for big insurers. We 
have indeed found that the LogNormal assumption (and then ρ(σ𝑁𝐿)) returns a multiplier equal to 3 only 
when σ𝑁𝐿 is roughly 14.47%. For smaller volatilities coefficients (as it usually happens for big insurers), 
Equation (1) leads to a capital requirement that is larger than QIS5. 
The net volume measure 𝑉𝑁𝐿  is equal to the sum of all the lines of business (LoBs) of net best estimate 
of claims reserve at the valuation date plus net premium volume. This volume is equal to the maximum 
between last year and next year earned premiums plus the expected present value of future premiums 
after one-year for existing contracts and contracts of the following year. Finally, in the valuation  
of 𝑉𝑁𝐿 , it is allowed to take into account a geographical diversification of business held in different  
macro-geographical regions of world, through the Herfindahl Index. 
With regard to σ𝑁𝐿, the overall volatility is derived by a double steps aggregation process based on 
an initial aggregation of standard deviation of premium and reserve risk of single LoB assuming a linear 
correlation coefficient equal to 0.5. Then, the standard deviation will be aggregated between different 
lines of business by using a given correlation matrix (see Annex IV of Delegated Acts [1] for details). 
In order to quantify the standard deviation of premium or reserve risk of a single LoB, two different 
approaches are provided. The first one is based on fixed volatility factors and it is defined as a  
“market-wide approach”, while the second one is based on methodologies (see Annex XVII of [1])  
that take into account the specific technical data of the company (“undertaking-specific approach”). 
Adoption of the latter approach must be approved by the supervising authority. The differences between 
market-wide and the undertaking-specific approach may be noticeable in the single-LoB volatility 
valuation. The market approach is based on a market-wide estimate of the standard deviation for 
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premium risk, determined by a specific volatility factor given as input (see Annex II and XIV of [1]). For 
instance, similarly to the main non-life LoB analyzed in the next, these factors for Premium risk are 
reported in Table 1. 









Volatility Factor 8.5% 8% 8% 10% 14% 
Only for Premium Risk, values of σ𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚,𝑙𝑜𝑏  can be multiplied by a non-proportional factor 𝑁𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑏  
in order to take into account existing Excess of Loss treaties. This factor is set out at 80% for Property, 
Motor Third Party Liabilities (MTPL) and General Third Party Liabilities (GTPL) and at 100% for  
other LoBs. 
It is, however, allowed to use an undertaking specific approach (see Annex XVII of [1]) to also derive 
an alternative estimate of 𝑁𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑏  based on the valuation of the reducing effect of XL treaty on the 
variability coefficient of the aggregate claim amount. In this case, the final value of  𝑁𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑏 will be a 
weighted average of fixed 𝑁𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑏 and the corresponding estimate. The weight of the factor estimated by 
data is given by a fixed credibility factor increasing the larger the available time-series. For all LoBs, 
the weights are greater than zero if data of at least last five years are available and tend to one. MTPL, 
GTPL and Credit and Suretyship should have data over 15 years and other LoBs at least over 10 years. 
3. General Framework 
We present an Internal Model for Premium Risk for a multi-line Non-Life insurer to take into account 
the characteristics of each line of business (LoB) and the diversification effect due to the aggregation of 
them. To introduce the framework, let ?̃?𝑡+1 be the random variable (r.v.5) of a one-year technical result 
for the period (𝑡, 𝑡 + 1), evaluated at the end of time 𝑡, as the difference between earned premium of the 
total portfolio with ℎ = 1, … , 𝐿 LoBs and total amount of claims and expenses of the year. For the sake 
of simplicity, we will start by considering a gross of reinsurance technical result. Generalizations to also 
include the reinsurance effect are in the next Section6. 











Earned premiums of a single LoB are here described as the difference between written premium of 
the year 𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑡 and the one-year change in premium reserve (?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑃 − 𝑉𝑡,ℎ
𝑃 ) for unearned premiums and 
unexpired risks evaluated under Solvency II criteria. In the same way we take into account the claim 
                                                 
4 It should be pointed out that Accident and Sickness are treated in the Health Non-SLT Module. In particular we report 
here the volatility factor for Income protection Insurance A different volatility factor (equal to 5%) is provided for 
Medical Expenses insurance. 
5
 From now on, tilde over a letter will indicate a random variable. 
6 In the next Section we add a second term that takes into account reinsurance treaties. It considers premium received and 
claims paid by the reinsurer and other amounts function of the reinsurance form (as commission for Quota Share treaties). 
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cost of the year, by considering both payments (?̃?) for claims and the provisions for outstanding claims 
(?̃?𝑡+1
𝑆 ). Regarding premium risk, we consider only payment for losses of claims incurred during the year 
𝑡 + 1 (?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑,𝐶𝑌
) and the reserve at the end of year 𝑡 + 1 for new claims (?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑆,𝐶𝑌
). Both payments and 
reserves for claims incurred in previous years are necessarily covered by initial claims reserve and their 
volatility attains to reserve risk. Finally we assume random the expenses ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ too. 
Formula (2) may be rewritten as follows:  
?̃?𝑡+1 = ∑(𝑃𝑡+1,ℎ + λℎ𝑃𝑡+1,ℎ + 𝑐ℎ𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ + 𝑉𝑡,ℎ
𝑃 − ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ







In Equation (3), gross premiums of the ℎ -th LoB are represented by risk premiums split into  
three components: the expected amount for claims of current year 𝑃ℎ = 𝐸(?̃?ℎ
𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑,𝐶𝑌
+ ?̃?ℎ
𝑆,𝐶𝑌) ,  
the safety loadings (λℎ ∙ 𝑃ℎ ) and the expense loading equal to the expected amount of expenses,  
i.e., 𝑐ℎ𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ = 𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ). 
For sake of simplicity, we can assume that earned premiums and written premiums are equal7 and 
recalling a classical notation in Risk Theory, we can identify the aggregate claim amount by a generic 
random variable ?̃? = ?̃?𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑,𝐶𝑌 + ?̃?𝑆,𝐶𝑌 independent by paid or reserved claims:  




where ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ describes the aggregate claim amount of next year related to new business. 
To evaluate characteristics of ?̃?𝑡+1, we can make some assumptions about aggregate claim amounts 
and expenses. Following the collective approach (e.g., see [5,8,17]), for each LoB, the aggregate claims 
amount is given by a mixed compound process: 




where the number of claims distribution, ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ, follows the Poisson law, with parameter, 𝑛, increasing 
year by year according to the real growth rate 𝑔 (i.e., 𝑛𝑡+1,ℎ = 𝑛𝑡,ℎ(1 + 𝑔ℎ)). We are assuming that the 
expected number of claims grows along with the number of contracts. Frequency is then constant in 
period (𝑡, 𝑡 + 1). In the present paper, trends as well as long-term cycles are not considered and only 
short-term fluctuations that may affect the volatility of the number of claims are taken into account. For 
this purpose, a structural variable ?̃?ℎ  will be introduced to represent short-term fluctuations in the 
number of claims. Then we have that 𝑛 turns out to be a stochastic parameter (𝑛𝑡+1,ℎ ∙ ?̃?ℎ) where ?̃?ℎ has 
its own probability distribution depending on the short-term fluctuations it is going to represent.  
In Section 5, we will assume that ?̃?ℎ is Gamma distributed with mean equal to one. Standard results from 
mathematical statistics imply that the mixture Poisson-Gamma leads to a Negative Binomial  
r.v. for the number of claims. 
The claim size amounts ?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1,ℎ  are assumed i.i.d. and scaled by the claim inflation rate 𝑖ℎ .  
In other words, we have that simple moments of order r of severity distribution are equal to  
                                                 
7 See [18] for an analysis of this relation in order to consider the effect of premium reserve. 




𝑟 ) = (1 +  𝑖ℎ)
𝑟  ∙  𝐸(?̃?𝑡,ℎ
𝑟 ). Different distributional assumptions (for details see [19]) may be 
considered for claim size but for sake of simplicity and without loss of generalization, only the results 
under LogNormal assumption will be reported below. 
In order to take into account expense volatility, we will assume that acquisition and management 





𝑀𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ) respectively, with 𝑐ℎ
𝐴 + 𝑐ℎ
𝑀 = 𝑐ℎ . The coefficients 𝑐ℎ
𝐴 
and 𝑐ℎ
𝑀  represent the percentages of gross premiums used to cover respectively acquisition and 
management expenses. σℎ
𝐴 and σℎ
𝑀 describe the standard deviation of expense ratios considering only 
acquisition or management expenses. 
To simulate expenses, a LogNormal distribution has been used in the next case study. It will be 
assumed that expenses are not correlated to the claim amount. However, the distributional and 
dependence assumptions do not have a great impact on the capital charge (except for specific lines as 
Credit and Suretyship or Financial Losses for some specialist insurers). 
Under these assumptions, main cumulants of ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ  and ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ  may be derived to obtain exact 
formulae for cumulants of technical results of a single line of business. 
The cumulant generating function (f.g.c.), Ψ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ(𝑠), of technical result of the ℎ-th single LoB is:  
Ψ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ(𝑠) = 𝑠 ∙ 𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ − Ψ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ(𝑠) − Ψ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
(𝑠) =  
=  𝑠 ∙ 𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ − Ψ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ(𝑠) − Ψ?̃?ℎ
(𝑛𝑡+1,ℎ𝑀?̃?,𝑡+1,ℎ(𝑠) − 𝑛𝑡+1,ℎ) 
 
where 𝑀?̃?,𝑡+1,ℎ(𝑠) is the moment generating function of claim-size. 
Then, the mean, variance and skewness of ?̃?ℎ,𝑡+1 are:  








2   
𝛾(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ) =  
=
μ3(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝐴 ) + μ3(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ




















 are non-central moments of ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ  of order 𝑟 and μ3(∙) describes the central moment  
of order 3. 
Aggregated technical results will depend instead on the dependence assumed between several lines 
of business. According to the VaR risk measure (see [20]) at confidence level α = 99.5% as defined by 
Solvency II ([1]), the capital requirement (SCR) for Premium could be derived as:  
𝑆𝐶𝑅α = −𝑉𝑎𝑅1−α(?̃?𝑡+1) = 𝑉𝑎𝑅α (∑ ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ + ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝐿
ℎ=1




It is noteworthy that we recognize expected profits/losses in the capital requirement evaluation by 
considering safety loadings. From our point of view, safety loading should be regarded, but it is not clear 
if it will be allowed in Internal Model by the supervisor, because QIS5 [16] and Delegated Acts [1] Standard 
Formula do not mention it in the evaluation (see Section 2). This solution in the Standard Formula is 
coming from the QIS5 multiplier of standard deviation found as the distance between the desired quantile 
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(at 99.5% level) and the expected losses. It is worth pointing out that this approach would be not 
conservative if underpricing was in force, and a negative technical result would be expected implying a 
consequent higher risk profile. 
4. Reinsurance Effect 
In order to consider the effect of reinsurance treaties, Formula (4) may be enriched as follows:  
?̃?𝑡+1









𝑅𝐸   describes premiums paid to the reinsurer, while ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸  is the amount of claims paid or 
reserved born by the reinsurer. Finally, we consider stochastic ceding commissions ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸   that the reinsurer 
usually pays in proportional treaties to the ceding company for the afforded commercial expenses. 
We will consider in the next Section either the case of fixed commissions equal to a deterministic 
percentage of premiums or the case of “sliding scale” commissions. A sliding scale commission is a 
percent of premium paid by the reinsurer to the ceding company, which “slides” with the actual loss 
experience, usually subjected to minimum and maximum amounts. 
We start by considering the effect of two global Quota Share treaties, with either fixed commissions 
or sliding commissions. 
As is well known, in the case of a Quota Share reinsurance treaty, with an insurer’s retention quota 
βℎ ∈ (0,1) , the aggregate claim amount charged to reinsurer is equal to ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = (1 − 𝛽ℎ)?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ .  
On the other hand, the gross premiums ceded to the reinsurer are:  
𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = (1 − βℎ)𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ  
In proportional treaties, the reinsurer pays the cedant a commission on the premiums it receives to 
compensate for the cost of acquiring the business and maintaining the portfolio. To describe 
commissions, we have assumed ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = ?̃?ℎ
𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 . In this regard, we consider two alternative ways. 
On one hand we assume a fixed percentage of ceded premiums as commission: 𝐶𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑐ℎ
𝑅𝐸𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸   
(i.e., ?̃?ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑐ℎ
𝑅𝐸). On the other hand, we consider a sliding commission that rewards or penalizes the 
insurer according to the quality of portfolio protected by the treaty. The system consists of a variable 
commission whose value depends by the observed loss ratio (see [15]). 
We assume to describe the random commission rate according to the next formula:  
?̃?ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑐ℎ




where 𝐿?̃?ℎ,𝑡+1 is the loss ratio at time 𝑡 + 1. Sliding commissions are here assumed not subjected to 
minimum and maximum amounts. In Section 6, we will also test numerically the effect of a different 
structure where a minimum and maximum commission is provided when observed loss ratio falls out of 
a certain range. For each line of business, we can easily derive the characteristics of technical result net 
of reinsurance ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑛𝑒𝑡  and of aggregate claim amount retained by ceding company. 
We report exact cumulants of combined ratio net of reinsurance 𝐶?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑛𝑒𝑡  for both cases of fixed 
(𝐶?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑛𝑒𝑡,𝑄𝑆𝐹) and scaling commissions (𝐶?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑛𝑒𝑡,𝑄𝑆𝑆). 
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First of all, the expected combined ratio net of Quota Share treaty, 𝐶?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑛𝑒𝑡,𝑄𝑆
, for both fixed and scaling 
commissions is:  
𝐸(𝐶?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑛𝑒𝑡,𝑄𝑆) = 𝐸 (
?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ + ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ − ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ












Note that the net combined ratio is equal to 𝐸(𝐶?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠,𝑄𝑆
) when commission rate 𝑐ℎ
𝑅𝐸 is equal to the 
expenses loading coefficient 𝑐ℎ . 




σ2(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ) + σ2(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ − ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 ) + σ2(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ

































with variability greater than the corresponding value for the gross of reinsurance case because of a higher 
volatility of net expense ratio. 
For sliding commissions, we have instead:  
σ(𝐶?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ

















































where we observe the effects of both variability of commissions and negative dependency between 
commissions and aggregate claims amount. We have indeed that the correlation coefficient is equal to:  
ρ(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 , ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 ) = −









and also ρ(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ, ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 ) = −1, i.e., they are negatively linear dependent, where we remind that βℎ  
denotes the insurer’s retention quota for line ℎ. 
Furthermore, we will consider Excess of Loss treaty, with a retention for claim unit and no limit to 
reinsurer exposure. In the case of an Excess of Loss treaty, the stochastic claim amount charged to the 
reinsurer for year 𝑡 is:  
?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
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having denoted by 𝑀𝑡+1,ℎ the insurer’s retention limit for year 𝑡 + 1. The reinsurer risk premium 𝑃𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸  
is given by the well-known relationship:  
𝑃𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = 𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸  ) = 𝑛𝑡+1,ℎ𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸  )  
No explicit commission and loss participations are usually provided in the case of the Excess of Loss 
coverage, so that we get: 𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑃𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 (1 + λℎ
𝑅𝐸) and ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = 0, with λℎ
𝑅𝐸 being the safety loading 
coefficient applied by reinsurer, usually greater than the safety loading coefficient λℎ ,  
as increasing as the insurer’s retention limit is growing up.
In general, the f.g.c. net of XL is equal to:  
Ψ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑛𝑒𝑡 (𝑠) = 𝑠 ∙ (𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ − 𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 ) − Ψ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ(𝑠) − Ψ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑛𝑒𝑡 (𝑠) =  
= 𝑠 ∙ (𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ − 𝐵𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑅𝐸 ) − Ψ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ(𝑠) − Ψ?̃?ℎ
(𝑛𝑡+1,ℎ𝑀?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝑛𝑒𝑡 (𝑠) − 𝑛𝑡+1,ℎ) 
 
from which we can derive cumulants of technical result net of XL in a similar way as the Quota  
Share case. 
5. Numerical Analysis 
To show the effect of an Internal Model (IM) based on a Collective Risk Model for Premium risk, 
two non-life insurance companies with a different dimension are considered (their figures are summed 
up in Table 2). It is assumed that both insurers underwrite business in the same five lines of business 
(Accident, Motor Other Damages (MOD), Property, Motor Third-Party Liability and General  
Third-Party Liability) with the same mix of portfolio (the proportions used resemble the real proportions 
in the Italian insurance market). The comparison of results will allow us to describe the effect of a 
different portfolio size on the aggregate claims amount distribution and on the capital requirements. 
Table 2. Gross premium volumes of both insurers (amounts in mln of Euro). 
LoBs 
OMEGA EPSILON Both Insurers 
Bt Bt+1 Bt Bt+1 Bt,h/Ʃh Bt,h 
Accident 100.0 105.0 10.0 10.5 10.0% 
MOD 100.0 105.0 10.0 10.5 10.0% 
Property 150.0 157.5 15.0 15.8 15.0% 
MTPL 550.0 577.5 55.0 57.8 55.0% 
GTPL 100.0 105.0 10.0 10.5 10.0% 
TOTAL 1000.0 1050.0 100.0 105.0 100.0% 
The main parameters of Collective Risk Model are in Table 3. As we can see, both insurers have the 
same characteristics apart from the expected number of claims. OMEGA is assumed to be ten times larger 
than EPSILON. Safety loading coefficient (λ) and the standard deviation of structure variable (σ𝑞) are 
obtained mainly by Italian market Loss Ratios and Combined Ratios. About λ, it depends by the mean 
of the empirical combined ratios. It shows a negative value for LoBs where the observed combined ratios 
are on average greater than one e.g., in GTPL. Furthermore, it is noteworthy to recall that the safety 
loading is here expressed as a percentage of risk premium. Expense parameters (see 𝑐𝑀, 𝑐𝐴, σ𝑀, σ𝐴 
defined in Section 3) have been calibrated by using the historical pattern of both management and 
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acquisition expenses in the same period. The small values of σ𝑀 and σ𝐴 that will lead to a low variability 
of expenses producing a low additional capital requirement for expense risk could be noticed. The CV 
of claim size (𝑐𝑧) is fixed, for each LoB, and calibrated on the Italian market data. Moreover, the expected 
number of claims (𝑛𝑡) and the expected claim cost (𝑚𝑡) reported in Table 3 for each LoB are referred to 
the initial year 𝑡; they will increase in the examined year 𝑡+1 as described in the previous Section for the 
dynamic portfolio, according to the annual rate of real growth of portfolio (𝑔) as well as to the number 
of claims and the annual claim inflation rate (𝑖) and to claim size, assumed to be almost 2% and 3% 
respectively for all LoBs in the simulations. 
Table 3. Parameters for premium risk. 
Insurers LoBs 𝑛𝑡 𝜎𝑞 𝑔 𝑚𝑡 𝑐𝑧 𝑖 𝜆 𝑐
𝑀, 𝑐𝐴,  𝜎𝑀 𝜎𝐴 
OMEGA 
Accid. 16,428 15.2% 1.9% 3200 3 3% 27.7% 4.6% 28.2% 0.3% 0.8% 
MOD 25,900 11.1% 1.9% 2500 2 3% 13.9% 4.7% 21.5% 0.4% 1.4% 
Prop. 18,849 6.9% 1.9% 6000 8 3% −6.4% 4.7% 24.8% 0.6% 0.6% 
MTPL 116,509 8.6% 1.9% 4000 4 3% −4.0% 4.7% 14.0% 0.7% 0.8% 
GTPL 8225 12.8% 1.9% 10,000 12 3% −13.1% 4.5% 24.0% 0.8% 1.5% 
EPSILON 
Accid. 1643 15.2% 1.9% 3200 3 3% 27.7% 4.6% 28.2% 0.3% 0.8% 
MOD 2590 11.1% 1.9% 2500 2 3% 13.9% 4.7% 21.5% 0.4% 1.4% 
Prop. 1885 6.9% 1.9% 6000 8 3% −6.4% 4.7% 24.8% 0.6% 0.6% 
MTPL 11,651 8.6% 1.9% 4000 4 3% −4.0% 4.7% 14.0% 0.7% 0.8% 
GTPL 823 12.8% 1.9% 10,000 12 3% −13.1% 4.5% 24.0% 0.8% 1.5% 
Characteristics of simulated distribution of losses for Premium risk and for each LoB are reported in 
Table 4. One million simulations have been applied in order to assure stable convergence. Premium risk, 
CV, and skewness of the Aggregate amount of next-year claims plus expenses ( ?̃?𝑡+1 + ?̃?𝑡+1 ) are  
figured out. 
The high variability of GTPL because of a large variability coefficient of claim-size is noteworthy. 
Furthermore, the effect of non-pooling risk is significant for MOD and Property. As expected, we have 
indeed that the bigger insurer shows for several LoB a CV of ?̃?𝑡+1 slightly greater than the value of the 
standard deviation of σ𝑞  because of the relevant diversification effect. The effect of size is indeed 
noticeable for EPSILON company where LoBs with high 𝑐𝑍  as Property and GTPL show the greater 
increase of variability with respect to OMEGA. 
Finally, the aggregate distribution has been derived by assuming a Gaussian Copula function whose 
parameters have been calibrated by using the correlation matrix proposed by the standard Formula in 
Technical Specifications of QIS5 (see [16]) and Delegated Acts [1]. We limited the analysis to this 
simple choice of copula having at its disposal correlation coefficient provided by the Standard Formula, 
but the evaluation may be properly extended in order to consider both a more significant tail dependency 
between several LoBs and hierarchical structure based on Archimedean Copulas to aggregate LoBs  
(see at this regard [21]). Despite the positive correlation provided by Solvency II, we observe in Table 4 
a, diversification effect between LoBs. 
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Table 4. CV and skewness of simulated distribution for each LoB (Gross of Reinsurance). 
LoBs 
OMEGA EPSILON 
?̃?𝒕+𝟏 ?̃?𝒕+𝟏 ?̃?𝒕+𝟏 + ?̃?𝒕+𝟏 ?̃?𝒕+𝟏 ?̃?𝒕+𝟏 ?̃?𝒕+𝟏 + ?̃?𝒕+𝟏 
CV Skew. CV Skew. CV Skew. CV Skew. CV Skew. CV Skew. 
Accident 15.34% 0.30 2.53% 0.08 9.49% 0.30 17.01% 0.37 2.53% 0.08 10.52% 0.37 
MOD 11.15% 0.22 5.45% 0.18 8.09% 0.21 11.89% 0.23 5.44% 0.18 8.60% 0.22 
Property 9.00% 0.95 2.88% 0.15 6.52% 0.92 19.66% 6.56 2.88% 0.15 14.16% 6.52 
MTPL 8.68% 0.18 5.40% 0.19 7.18% 0.17 9.39% 0.21 5.39% 0.20 7.76% 0.21 
GTPL 18.26% 2.84 5.87% 0.18 13.65% 2.79 42.14% 12.87 5.87% 0.18 31.34% 12.82 
Total 5.87% 0.24 2.62% 0.15 4.55% 0.23 7.86% 2.73 2.62% 0.15 6.07% 2.69 
Table 5 shows SCR ratio obtained by IM as the capital requirement for Premium risk divided by 
initial gross premium volume. According to OMEGA, as expected, the highest ratios are registered for the 
line GTPL (65.3%) due mainly to its large variability (CV = 13.7%). Property and MTPL show high 
ratios too (respectively 26.7% and 24.8%). The large safety loadings lead to lower ratios for MOD 
(11.9%) and Accident (9.1%). Focusing on EPSILON, the effect of pooling risk is clearly noticeable on 
Premium risk capital charges. 
Table 5. SCR ratio (
𝑆𝐶𝑅99.5%
𝐵𝑡




SCR Ratio  
(λ = 0) 
SCR Ratio  




SCR Ratio  
(λ = 0) 
SCR Ratio  
(No Exp. Risk) 
SCR Ratio 
(SF) 
Accident 9.08% 24.4% 8.99% 26.78% 12.19% 27.5% 12.11% 26.78% 
MOD 11.93% 21.4% 11.59% 25.20% 13.41% 22.9% 13.07% 25.20% 
Property 26.65% 21.6% 26.53% 25.20% 66.58% 61.5% 66.50% 25.20% 
MTPL 24.81% 21.3% 24.68% 31.50% 26.81% 23.3% 26.64% 31.50% 
GTPL 65.32% 54.0% 65.27% 44.10% 168.82% 157.5% 168.79% 44.10% 
Total 19.35% 17.0% 19.25% 22.78% 30.76% 28.2% 30.66% 22.78% 
As expected, the effect of expenses is not significant on the capital requirement for Premium risk. 
Finally, neglecting safety loading (i.e., assuming λ = 0), SCR is significantly greater for Accident and 
MOD (where λ > 0). By contrast, the choice of Standard Formula to not consider safety loading seems 
to be less prudential for most important LoBs, but it is influenced by the phase of the underwriting cycle. 
The SCR ratio for only Premium Risk, derived by applying the “market-wide approach” of the Standard 
Formula (SF) (see Section 2), is also reported in Table 5. 
Both insurers have the same ratios for each LoB when SF is applied because of the lack of a size 
factor. The total SCR ratio, derived by the SF, is also equal for both insurers having assumed the same 
mix of portfolio. It is interesting to compare this ratio to the results obtained by the IM. A consistent 
comparison could be developed only by considering the case of λ = 0 because, as previously mentioned, 
the Standard Formula neglects safety loading in capital requirement evaluation. We observe a saving of 
capital by using the Internal Model for OMEGA, while a significant increase of capital is requested for 
the smaller insurer if IM is used. 
Risks 2015, 3 175 
 
 
Main differences are justified by considering that volatility factor used in the Standard Formula have 
been calibrated on the European market, while main parameters of the Internal Model have been derived 
by considering the risk profile of each specific insurer. 
Exploring deeply the differences between IM and SF, some key points could be captured. 
(a) In the Internal Model, we are considering also the volatility of expenses, neglected by the 
Standard Formula. Main results confirm that the effect of expenses is not very significant for the 
LoB analyzed. 
(b) For OMEGA, the standard deviations of (𝑋/𝐵) of Accident (8.1%), MOD (7.2%), MTPL (7.4%) 
and Property (6.8%) are lower than volatility factors provided by the Standard Formula  
(see Table 1). A greater value is indeed observed for GTPL (15.1% against a volatility factor  
of 14%). For EPSILON, the high variability coefficient of severity distribution and a low expected 
number of claims lead to very high standard deviation of (𝑋/𝐵) for Property (15%) and GTPL 
(36%) when IM is applied. 
(c) Because of the skewness of the overall aggregate distribution, for both insurers, the ratio between 
99.5% quantile less the mean and the standard deviation is very far from the multiplier equal to 
3 fixed by the Standard Formula. The implicit multiplier, derived by IM as 
𝑉𝑎𝑅0.995(∑ ?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ
𝐿






, is equal to 2.76 for OMEGA and to 3.15 for EPSILON. 
6. The Effect of Alternative Reinsurance Strategies 
The model has been also applied net of reinsurance in order to compare the effect on capital 
requirement of different reinsurance treaties. For each line of business, we assume evaluating the 
following reinsurance strategies: 
- QSF1: Quota Share treaties with a retention βℎ equal to 90% for Accident and MOD, 80% for 
Property, 95% for MTPL and 85% for GTPL and a fixed commission applied to reinsurer 
premiums and equal to the expected expense ratio. In this case we have 𝑐ℎ = 𝑐ℎ
𝑅𝐸. 
- QSF2: Quota Share treaties with the same retentions βℎ of QSF1 and a fixed commission applied 
to reinsurer premiums and equal to 80% of the expected expense ratio. In this case we have  
𝑐ℎ
𝑅𝐸 = 0.8 𝑐ℎ. 
- QSS1: Quota Share treaties with the same retentions βℎ  of QSF1 and a sliding commission 
applied to reinsurer premiums. Provisional and expected commission rate is equal to 80% of the 
expected expense ratio 𝐸(𝑐ℎ
𝑅𝐸) = 0.8 𝑐ℎ, while the effective percentage varies according to the 
observed loss experience as provided by Formula (5). 
- QSS2: Quota Share treaties with the same retentions βℎ  of QSF1 and a sliding commission 
applied to reinsurer premiums. Provisional and expected commission rate is equal to 80% of the 
expected expense ratio 𝐸(𝑐ℎ
𝑅𝐸) = 0.8 𝑐ℎ . The commissions are adjusted also in this case 
according to the observed loss ratio. We build up five bins of width 10% and we modify the 
percentage according to the ratio between the average value of the classes where the observed 
loss ratio falls and the expected loss ratio. According to this classification, we assume a maximum 
value equal to the expected loss ratio plus 25% and a minimum value equal to the expected loss 
ratio less 25%. The excesses due to loss ratios outside the limits of the scale (above or below) are 
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not taken into account in the calculation of commission rate. This structure implicitly defines a 
minimum and a maximum commission. 
- XL: an XL treaty for each LoB with a retention limit equal to 𝑀𝑡+1,ℎ = 𝐸(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ ) + 15σ(?̃?𝑡+1,ℎ ). 
Safety loading coefficient λℎ
𝑅𝐸   of the reinsurer is equal to the safety loading coefficient of insurer, 
proportionally increased to take into account the savings of variability coefficient of the insurer 
because of reinsurance. 
- XLQS: a QS treaty with retention and sliding commissions equal to QSS2 for Accident, MOD 
and Property and a XL treaty with retention limit and safety loadings equal to XL1 for MTPL 
and GTPL. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of aggregate claim amount of Total Portfolio for OMEGA according to 
different reinsurance strategies. 
For the sake of simplicity, we report in Figures 1 and 2 only the aggregated distribution of aggregate 
claim amount of gross and net of reinsurance respectively in order to catch the effect of several treaties 
on the shape of distribution. Quota Share treaty intuitively leads to a variability coefficient and a 
skewness similar to the gross reinsurance case. We do not have the same CV because the different 
retentions between Lines of business lead to a different mix of portfolio with respect to reinsurance 
cases. We have instead a greater effect on CV and skewness when a XL treaty is used. Finally, the choice 
of different treaties between long-tail business and other LoBs leads to results similar to XL because of 
the high weight of MTPL on the total portfolio. 




Figure 2. Distribution of aggregate claim amount of Total Portfolio for EPSILON according 
to different reinsurance strategies. 




No Reins QS XL XLQS No Reins QS XL XLQS 
Accident 15.34% 15.34% 15.29% 15.34% 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
MOD 11.15% 11.15% 11.14% 11.15% 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Property 9.00% 9.00% 7.69% 9.00% 0.95 0.95 0.17 0.95 
MTPL 8.68% 8.68% 8.65% 8.65% 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
GTPL 18.26% 18.26% 14.27% 14.27% 2.84 2.84 0.18 0.18 




No Reins QS XL XLQS No Reins QS XL XLQS 
Accident 17.01% 17.01% 16.54% 17.01% 0.37 0.37 0.32 0.37 
MOD 11.89% 11.89% 11.79% 11.89% 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23 
Property 19.66% 19.66% 12.92% 19.66% 6.56 6.56 0.34 6.56 
MTPL 9.39% 9.39% 9.09% 9.09% 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.17 
GTPL 42.14% 42.14% 23.28% 23.28% 12.87 12.87 0.22 0.22 
Total 7.86% 7.75% 6.37% 6.69% 2.73 2.31 0.06 0.12 
Analyzing the effects on aggregate claim amount for each LoB (see Table 6), we observe a similar 
behavior of proportional and non-proportional treaties for Accident and MOD while a greater saving of 
variability and skewness is provided by XL for LoBs with a greater 𝑐𝑍 as MTPL, GTPL and Property. 
Because of a higher pooling risk, the relative effect of non-proportional treaties is higher for EPSILON. 
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We have in this case that aggregated CV moves from 7.9% to 6.3% and aggregated skewness varies 
from 2.73 to 0.06 when a XL treaty is applied. 
In order to consider the effect of pricing of the treaties, we evaluate the characteristics of Combined 
Ratio distribution. As previously described, several QS treaties are considered with the same retention 
and different commission rates. We report in Table 7 simulated characteristics of Combined Ratio (CR) 
of total portfolio for both insurers. It is noteworthy that the high number of simulations (1 million) assured 
a strong convergence of simulated moments to the exact ones. Some negligible differences are observed 
for high skewed LoB (as GTPL) of small companies. 
Table 7. Characteristics of Combined Ratio distribution for both insurers (Total Portfolio—
Gross and Net Reinsurance). 
LoBs Stats No Reins 
QSF1  
𝒄𝒓𝒆 = 𝒄  
Fixed Comm. 
QSF2  
𝒄𝒓𝒆 = 𝟎. 𝟖𝒄  
Fixed Comm. 
QSS1  
𝑬(𝒄𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟖𝒄  
Sliding Comm. 
QSS2  
𝑬(𝒄𝒓𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟖𝒄  
Classes (Min, Max) 
XL QSXL 
OMEGA 
Mean 101.29% 101.24% 101.77% 101.77% 101.77% 101.81% 102.20% 
St. Dev. 4.61% 4.73% 4.73% 4.81% 4.80% 4.47% 4.67% 
Skew. 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.11 0.14 
EPSILON 
Mean 101.29% 101.24% 101.77% 101.77% 101.77% 102.21% 102.40% 
St. Dev. 6.15% 6.09% 6.09% 6.27% 6.20% 5.01% 5.33% 
Skew. 2.69 2.27 2.25 2.39 2.15 0.05 0.11 
According to gross of reinsurance distribution, we observe an average CR on the portfolio greater 
than one because of negative safety loadings in Property, MTPL and GTPL. As already showed for 
aggregate claim amount characteristics, a higher variability and skewness for EPSILON is confirmed. 
Furthermore, the different results related to simulated distribution of combined ratios net of 
reinsurance can be compared. In particular, in the case of XL strategy, the distribution is heavily affected 
by reinsurer pricing with a higher combined ratio. On the other hand, this treaty allows the highest 
reduction of variability and skewness. With regard to proportional treaties, we observe the greater CV 
in the case of sliding commissions (QSS1) because of both the variance of ?̃?re and the dependence with 
the aggregate claim amount. A very slight reduction of variability and skewness with respect to QSS1 is 
observed when the QSS2 methodology is considered. In this case, sliding commissions are based on 
fixed classes with a minimum and a maximum value where if the observed loss ratio falls outside the 
range, these excesses are not considered in the commissions. The effect is more noticeable for EPSILON 
because of the higher variability of the company. 
Moving to SCR for Premium risk for OMEGA, we observe in Figure 3 how all strategies reduce the 
required capital, but they bring it into effect in a rather different way. In the case of the Quota Share, 
with fixed commissions equal to expenses loading, we have a reduction of required capital for each LoB 
equal to the quota to be reinsured (1 − βh). Other Quota Share treaties are more realistic by assuming 
lower commission rates or variable commissions, but the unfavorable pricing and the greater variability 
lead to a reduced saving of capital requirement. The XL strategy is clearly depressing the expected 
technical results. The assumed XL coverage is indeed more expensive than QS coverage, but it is more 
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effective on reducing the downside risk. In general, it provides a greater saving of capital except when 
compared to the Quota Share QSF1 with fixed commission rate so that 𝑐𝑟𝑒 = 𝑐. 
The ratio between total capital requirement for Premium Risk and gross premiums ranges indeed 
between 17.55% of QSF1 Treaty to 19.35% of Gross of Reinsurance case. As expected for lines with 
high variability and skewness as GTPL, XL is the most efficient treaty, despite the high pricing.  
For this LoB, the SCR net XL is indeed 47% of gross premiums against a ratio of 65% evaluated gross 
reinsurance, while the reinsurer applies a safety loading coefficient λ𝑅𝐸 equal to roughly 54% of ceded 
risk premiums for GTPL. 
 
Figure 3. SCR ratio for each LoB and Total SCR ratio according to different reinsurance 
strategies (OMEGA insurer). 
 
Figure 4. SCR ratio for each LoB and Total SCR ratio according to different reinsurance 
strategies (EPSILON insurer). 
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When the smaller company is considered (Figure 4), we have noticeable differences between 
proportional and non-proportional treaties. With respect to a capital ratio gross of reinsurance of roughly 
31%, QS treaties settle around 27%–29%, while XL shows a ratio of 21.5%. In this treaty, despite the 
greater safety loading of reinsurer (λ𝑅𝐸) for OMEGA, the higher the reduction of pooling risk, the greater 
is the saving of capital. We have indeed that in this case, not only GTPL but also Property shows a 
significant reduction of capital when XL is applied (78% and 35% of premiums for SCRnet against 169% 
and 67% gross of reinsurance). 
Furthermore, we can observe how XL treaties appear very efficient when higher confidence levels 
are taken into account. For example, when a confidence level of 99.97% is considered, the gross SCR 
ratio is respectively 31% and 79% for OMEGA and EPSILON, while the ratio net of XL is equal to 23% 
and 29% a roughly 15% and 64% less for the two companies. It is clear how the different dimensions 
lead to different effects when non-proportional treaties are considered. 
Finally the IM capital requirements can be compared with those obtained by the Standard Formula 
also for net of reinsurance cases (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. SCR ratios for both insurers derived by Internal Model and market-wide Standard Formula. 
Both insurers show again the same ratio when SF is considered because of the same mix of portfolio 
and the same reinsurance strategies. This result emphasizes another pitfall of the market-wide formula 
that provides, through the fixed NPlob factor, the same effect of non-proportional reinsurance despite a 
different size of portfolio. This factor, being independent by the characteristics of the XL treaty (as for 
example the attachment point of the layer), assumes for some LoBs a greater saving of variability with 
respect to the effective reduction obtained by analyzing the distribution of aggregate claim amount. We 
have indeed that the ratio between the variability coefficients net and gross of reinsurance for MTPL is 
equal to 99.6% for OMEGA and to 96.7% for EPSILON, while SF allows a NPlob equal to 80% for this 
LoB. Considering instead the GTPL, we derive IM ratios equal to respectively 78% and 56% for the 
insurers because of the high variability of this LoB. This overestimation of the effect of XL, provided 
by the Standard Formula for MTPL, shows a poor convenience in the development of the Internal Model 
for OMEGA when this treaty is applied. On the other hand, the SF provides a significant underestimation 
of capital requirement when the small insurer is considered. 
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Moving to Quota Share treaties, the effect of different commission rates is not considered by the 
Standard Formula that leads to the same capital ratio for all proportional treaties here analyzed. 
7. Conclusions 
A reliable comparison of different reinsurance covers provided by the real market makes the  
insurer able to identify the most appropriate strategic planning. Starting from the Collective Risk Theory 
approach, we extend the relations in order to consider proportional or non-proportional reinsurance 
strategies. By considering several Quota-Share treaties scenarios, we derive the exact characteristics of 
combined ratio distribution by considering the effect of alternative methodology on providing  
ceding commissions. 
Moreover, the Monte Carlo Simulation technique has allowed for the comparison of the effect on 
capital requirements of different strategies. This technique provides a useful insight of the whole 
complex risk process, with special advantages in cases of portfolios with a large skewness of the loss 
distribution, whereas the use of approximation formulas are not reliable. 
The proposed theoretical model is clearly a simplified version of a more complex model that should 
be built up, but here suitable analyses about primary insurance aspects have been preferred.  
In particular, we have focused on the mitigation effect of reinsurance on underwriting Premium Risk, 
neglecting the additional capital requirement needed to cover the default risk of the reinsurer, since the 
latter depends clearly on reinsurer reliability as a risk factor and only in terms of volume on the  
ceded business. 
The comparison with the Standard Formula, defined by Delegated Acts, has allowed us to emphasize 
some technical weaknesses of the market-wide approach, such as the lack of size factor, the use of a 
default value of the non-proportional factor and the replacement of the LogNormal assumption with a 
fixed multiplier. 
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